Jurisprudential Concept of Ownership

1. Introduction to the Concept of Ownership

The concept of ownership is one of the fundamental juristic concepts common to all systems of law. It is of both legal and social interest in nature. Not only the Courts utilized the idea in such a way as to give effect to views of changing individual and social interest, but so great are it's potentialities that in recent times it has become the focus of Government policy.

Ownership consists of an innumerable number of claims, liberties, powers and immunities with regard to the thing owned. According to some jurist a person owns a house means he has just those claims in respect of it. According to them there is no point in having the concept of ownership without these claims. Though may jurists do not agree with this view, according to them it is undesirable to have this concept of ownership only linked with certain claims. It is also been said that a person may part with the claims etc. to a greater extent, while retaining the right of ownership. Thus a person who has ownership over a plot of land against fee simple, may grant the leasehold of it to another with the result that his ownership is denuded of most of its content. As long as he has the fee he is 'owner,' which shows that his right of ownership is distinct from its contents.[1]

The idea of ownership developed by slow degrees with the growth of civilization. So long as the people were wandering from place to place and had no settled place of residence, they had no sense of ownership. The idea began to grow when they started planting trees, cultivating land, building their homes. The transition from a pastoral to an agricultrual economy helped the development of the idea of ownership. People began to think in terms of'mine and thine[2]. To begin with no distinction was used to be been made between ownership and possession. However, with the advancement of the civilization the distinction became clearer and clearer. This distinction was made very clearly in Roman law. Two distinct terms were used to point out the distinction and these were 'dominium' and 'possessio.'[3] Dominium denoted the absolute right to a thing. Possessio implied only physical control over a thing. The English notion of ownership is similar to the concept of dominium in Roman law. According to Holdsworth, the English law reached the concept of ownership as an absolute right through development in the law of possession.

2. Definitions of Various Thinkers

According to Keeton, "the right of ownership is a conception clearly easy to understand but difficult to define with exactitude.” There are two main theories with regard to this idea of ownership. The great exponents of the two viewers are Austin and Salmond. According to one view, “ownership is a relation, which subsists between a person and a thing, which is the object of ownership. According to the second view, ownership is a relation between a person and a right that is vested with him."[4]

According to the Austin, "ownership means a right which avails against everyone who is subject to the law conferring the right to put thing to user of infinite nature." According to him full ownership is defined as "a right indefinite in point of user, unrestricted in point of disposition and unlimited in point of duration." Therefore, it is right in rem. i.e. against the whole world.

1. According to Austin, the first attribute ownership is that it is indefinite in point of user because the owner in whatever way he likes to use may use the thing that owned. In case of complete ownership it can only be restricted by means of operation of law. But there are two basic principles;

a) Use your own property and not to injure your neighbour's.

 b) It is not lawful to build something upon your land to the injury of another. In the case of, Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board,[5] it was held that the burial board is responsible for damages to the extent of price of the horse which died on account of eating a portion of a yew tree planted by the burial board on it's own land.

2. The second attribute of the ownership is a right of transfer or disposition without any restriction. But generally in most of the legal system there is a reasonable restriction.

3. The third attribute of the ownership is the permanent nature of the right ownership. According to Austin right extinguishes only with the destruction of the thing, which is owned.

4. But Austin also says that this right of ownership can be transferred by way of succession.

Holland is also the follower of same view. According to Holland, “Ownership is a plenary control over object[6]”. The right is limited only by the rights of the state or of other individual.

According to Hibbert, “ownership involves four rights and those are the rights of using the thing, excluding others from using it, disposing of the thing, and the destruction of it.[7]”

According to Pollock. "ownership may be described as the entirety of the powers of use and disposal allowed by law. This implies that there is some power of disposal, and in modern times we should hardly be disposed to call a person an owner who had no such power at all, though we are familiar with 'limited owners' in recent usage. According to him we must not suppose that all the powers of an owner need be exercisable at once and immediately; a person may remain owner though the person has parted with some of them for a time. In short, the owner of a thing is not necessarily the person who had at a given time has the whole power of use and disposal; very often there is no such person[8].

According to the Salmond, “Ownership is in its most comprehensive signification, denotes the relation between a person and that right is vested in him. That which a man owns is in all cases a right. According to Salmond to own a piece of land means in truth to own a particular kind of right in the land, namely the fee simple of it."[9] According to him ownership may extend to all classes of right, whether propriety or personal in rem or in personam, in re propria or in re aliena.

3. Essentials of ownership

1. It is indefinite in point of user[10]. It is impossible to definite or sum up exhaustively the wide variety of ways in which the thing owned might be used by the person entitled to its ownership. A person not being the owner may be entitled to possess or use a thing for a limited period. But in case of an owner, it is of an intermediate duration. Interest of the owner is perpetual. Under all mature legal systems, qualifications have been imposed on the user of the property. It is now a settled principle that every owner must not injure others for enjoying the property.
2. Another important essential of ownership is that it is unrestricted in point of disposition. The right of alienation is considered by Austin as a necessary incident of ownership. An owner can effectively dispose of his property by way of conveyance during his lifetime or by will after death. But it is not completely free from restrictions. If it is found that the aim of this transfer is to defeat the creditors then it can be restricted.
3. The owner has a right to possess the thing, which he owns. It is immaterial whether he has actual possession of it or not. But the essential thing is that he should have the right possession.
4. An owner may part with several rights in respect of the thing that is owned by him. In spite of that, he continues to be the owner of the thing in view the residuary character of ownership.
5. The owner has the right to destroy or alienate the thing he owns. Now right to destroy is no more an essential.

4. Types of ownership

There are different kinds of ownership; some of them are corporeal and incorporeal, sole ownership and co-ownership, legal and equitable ownership, vested and contingent ownership, trust and beneficial ownership, absolute and limited ownership.

Corporeal and incorporeal ownership: - Corporeal ownership is the ownership of a material object (e.g. house) and incorporeal ownership is the ownership of a right (e.g. intellectual property)[11].

Sole ownership and co-ownership.-When a person owns a property in one time it is called sole ownership. If the property is owned by more than one person then it is called joint ownership. By means of partition one person can have co-ownership converted into sole ownership.[12]

Legal and equitable ownership. - Legal ownership is that which has its origin in the rules of common law and equitable ownership is that which proceeds from the rule of equity. There are some cases where equity recognizes ownership where law does not recognize ownership owing to some legal defect. First right can be enforced in rem whereas second one is available in person.'[13]

Vested and contingent ownership.-If the owner of a property is having perfect title over a future property then that will be called as property with vested interest. If the owner is having imperfect title over such future property then that is called as a property with contingent interest. In the first case the person is having perfect title over such property while in the second case the person is not having such title.

A spes successionis[14] or chance of succession is the expectancy of an heir to succeed to the property of a relation on the latter's death.

In Sashi Kantha v. Pramodechandra[15], the Calcutta High Court has pointed out the distinction between this vested and contingent interest over the property. In this case it was held that in the vested ownership there is the immediate right of present enjoyment or a present right of future enjoyment but if the right of enjoyment is made to depend upon some event or condition, which may or may not happen then it is contingent ownership.

Trust and beneficial ownership. - Trust ownership is an instance of duplicate ownership where two persons own property at the same time. The relation between the owners is such that one of them is under an obligation to use his ownership for the benefit of the other. This ownership is called beneficial ownership.[16]

Absolute and limited ownership.-An absolute owner is one in whom are vested all the rights over a thing to the exclusion of all. When there are limitations on the user, duration or disposal of rights, of ownership, the ownership is limited ownership.[17]

5. Indian concept of ownership

The scope of the right of swamitva (ownership) of property as comprising of title to the property with bhukti or bhoga (possession) or if not in possession the right to be in or to get possession of the property, as also right for possession with title but with limited rights, or even with out any right, are covered by specific persons in the smritis[18]. According to jurists, ownership is possession coupled with a legitimate title[19].

In Bramha Puran[20] seven modes of acquisition of title are given.[21]  There it has been also said that the property obtained at partition or by inheritance or by royal grant is recognized as someone's real property. Therefore there is no dispute about the ownership in this case. It was said that acquisition of property by illegitimate means did not confer right of ownership.

In ancient time there were two types of ownership, depending upon the power to sale. These are, a) absolute ownership, b) limited ownership. In case of absolute ownership they had right to sale the property because the person has acquired absolute title over it. But in case of limited ownership, the person on possession of the property did not have absolute right to sale or dispose of the property, e.g. mortgage.

In ancient Indian concept the property was considered to be of two kind, Jangama (movable) and sthavara (immovable). In the laws relating to the purchase and sale both are considered to be Panya[22] (saleable property). There it was said that a person who is the owner of a property, whether movable and immovable, is entitled to transfer his ownership to another person through sale. In ancient time, which is mostly found in smrithis is that they used to consider sale as a valid mode of transfer like present time. In smritikara time, only a person having a proper valid title over the property could transfer it. In Yagnabalka writings also, it could be found that the shift or sale made by any person other than is owner is null and void. Those smritikaras in fact gave more importance to concept of ownership than recent time.they even said that the gift or pledge made without real ownership should be rescinded whereas now it is voidable at the option of the real owner.

Rama Jois has opined that the essential under the ownership of Hindu law was the title of the property. He states that through the ancient Hindus considered possession to be one of the important attributes of ownership, they didn’t consider possession to be absolute proof of ownership. Therefore, for a valid transfer, ownership over that property was considered the most essential element[23].

The ancient texts held that when it is established that if a vendor sold the property without actual ownership then he should restore the property to the actual owner and should pay the vendee the price received by him, and shall also pay a fine to the kind[24]. In those ancient texts it was also found that in this regard criminal justice system was very much in force and thus in all complaints relating to sale without ownership, it was the duty of the buyer to produce the vendor before the Court and himself to prove that the purchase made by him was under a honest and bona fide belief that the property belonged to the vendor. But at the same time there were provision, which said that if the person who is claiming his ownership fails to prove it then he will be liable to be punished like a thief by the king."

Katyayan[25] in his writing has said that when the purchase of a property has been made before a group of merchants and in frontof the officer of the kind then the person claiming the ownership may get back the property after paying half the price of the property and the reason given for this was a sort of punishment for the real owner of the property for not being careful about the property.

Manu[26] has said that if the offender (who sells the property without ownership) is a kinsman of the real owner, he shall be fined six hundred panas. It was said that if the person is not a kinsman then he should be guilty of theft.33 Further it has been said in his writing that if a sale or gift of a property is made without real ownership then it will be considered to be null and void. He also gave a lot of importance to the proof of a person's ownership. According to Manu where the possession is evident, but no title is perceived, there the title shall be a proof of an ownership.[27]

In ancient time the king was considered to be the lord of only land and not other kind of wealth. In fact king's right was restricted to only one-sixth of the income from the land. Thereby that time king only had a limited ownership over land, real ownership vested with the individuals on various modes. Though that time the ownership over land was granted to individuals, the right to minerals and mining was still in the domain of the kinds. Therefore the king was having monopoly over mines and mineral.

Also after the framing of Constitution the growth with regard to the concept of ownership continued to develop as such. In this respect the Apex Court of India took some important initiatives.[28] In old law the concept of 'acquisition and 'requisitioning' of property referred to entry 42, List III, Sch. VII of our Constitution.

The provisions in Articles 299 and 300 were results of considerable thought and debate. In its report, Joint Parliamentary Committee[29] on Indian Constitutional reform said in its report that an appropriate provision should be made in order to

      "………Secure that legislation expropriating or authorizing the expropriation of the property of particular individuals should be lawful only if confined to expropriation for public purposes[30]" and if compensation is determined, either in the first instance or in appeal, by some independent authority. General legislation, on the other hand, the effect of which would be to transfer to public ownership some particular class of property, or to extinguish or modify the rights of individual in it ought, we think, to require the previous sanction of the Governor general or the Governor too its introduction, and in that event he should be directed by his instrument of instructions to take into account as a relevant factor the nature of the provisions proposed for compensating those whose interest would be adversely affected by the legislation ."[31]

Therefore it can be stated from the report submitted by the JPC that in India there was private owned property, more accurately, "vested interest," which require specific protection, namely, grants of lands or of tenure of land free of land revenue, or subject to partial remission of land revenue, owned under various names, of which taluk, inam, watan, jagir, and muafi were examples, such grants were perpetual. These grants had the authority of the British Governemnt that on the due observance by the grantee of the specified conditions, the rights of himself and his successor would be respected for all time or for the duration of the grant. The sanad granted by Lord Canning to the taluqdar of Oudh was an instance of a grant in perpetuity, the rights conferred by the Sanad being permanent, hereditary and transferable. In connection with this kind of property the JPC said -

“....Some of the claims to protection which have been urged upon us… would be satisfied by little less than a statutory declaration which would have the effect of maintaining-unaltered and unalterable for all time, however, strong the justification for its modification might prove to be in the light of changed circumstances, every promise or undertaking of the kind made by the British Government in past. We recommend, however, that the Constitution Act should contain an appropriate provision requiring the consent of the Governor-general or the Governor, as the case may be to any proposal, legislative or executive, which would alter and prejudice the rights of the predecessor of any privilege of the kind to which we have referred."[32]

The above mentioned rights generally belonged to individuals before. The JPC also dealt with the rights of zamindars and others in parts of the UP and Madras in the eighteenth century.

In Indian concept a contract for sale of immovable property creates an enforceable obligation and not any interest or charge on it. According to Indian concept of ownership only legal ownership not dual ownership[33] is legal as well as equitable and is recognised under the law[34].

The Indian law does not recognize legal and equitable estates. Therefore there can be one 'owner.' Where the property is vested in a trustee. The right of beneficiary is, in proper case, to call upon the trustee to convey to him. Until conveyance he is not the .owner.[35]

The 'transfer of ownership' marks the difference between a sale and a mortgage. In case of mortgage, the mortgagee holds the property as a security or debt, and not absolutely, and therefore is having limited interest on the property[36].

In Indian law, relinquishment does not pass ownership[37]. In a case further it was stated that title to land couldn't pass by admission with regard to relinquishment of it.[38]

In Krishna Tanhaji v. Aba Shetta, It has been stated that compromise with regard to a property Is only an acknowledgment of the existing rights and there is no transfer of property and, therefore, by way of a compromised decree no valid sale can be entered into[39].

In Indian law the concept of co-ownership was also well recognized; according to Indian laws co-owner is not allowed to cause prejudice to other co-sharers by putting up a substantial construction during the pendency of a suit. Thus it can be said that in Indian law the concept of co-ownership is still well recognized. But in case of dwelling house if the co-owner is not in actual possession of the property, then it cannot be transferred[40]. But a co-owner will have a right to resist sale of a property owned by him jointly, when the property is going to be sold to a third party.

In Indian law co-owner is entitled to have three essentials of ownership, right to possession, right to enjoy, and right to dispose. Therefore if an owner is deprived of his property, he has right to be put in possession thereof. All the three' essentials are satisfied in thee case of co-owner of a land. Such co-owner has an interest` in every infinitesimal portion of the subject-matter and each has the right, irrespective of the quantity of his interest, to be in possession of every part and parcel of the property, jointly with others. Therefore, it can be said that jurisprudentially it is not correct to say that co-owner of a property is not its real owner.

6. Western concept of ownership

The term "ownership" is often used to describe generally the position of any person who has a right or right over thing. That is any person who has a right over a thing (j us in re) is called the owner of that right[41]. Some writers deprecate the use of the term in such cases and restrict the term to material objects only, but we must admit that between the ownership of a thing and the ownership of a right there is much similarity. Both owners have jus in re and in rem. Both deal with the object of their right as they please. Salmond treats it as a relation between a person and any right vested in him.[42] Jurists like Cook have severely criticized the idea, which says that a man owns a land or any peace of a material object means he owns a particular right.

Ownership in English law has to be approached historically, for its evolution is bound with the remedies that used to be available. The piecemeal development through actions prevented the formation of a clear cut development. The reason for such argument is that unlike Roman law it did not have anything like absolute ownership.

According to Maitland, quoting Dr. Murrary, the term 'owner' occurred in 1340, and the term 'ownership' in 1583.[43] A further step in the differentiation of seisin and possession came with the tenant of years. Whereas seisin was protected by the writ of right, the termor’s interest was protected by a form of trespass. de ejection firmae. A man's interest was not seisin, it was styled possession, which sharpened the contrast between seisin and possession. In modern law there are many cases, which show that ownership of land is only a question of the 'better right' to retain or obtain possession relative to other party to the dispute.

The development of the law relating to chattels took different line. There was nothing resembling a doctrine of estates. Land holding, not the possession of chattels, was the index to a person's public and private position. Chattels were of comparatively little significance and there was, no ownership in them. They had a fungible character, that is to say, transfer or restoration of equivalent chattels sufficed and later money. This was because, in the nature of things, the interest of a person in a particular chattel was neither so important nor so permanent as his interest in the land. Maitland doubts 'whether there was any right in movable goods that deserves the name of ownership.

To ascertain ownership over a property the concept of trespass was also introduced. The idea of 'better right' to obtain or retain possession evolved through trover and detinue: the plaintiff could succeed if he could have established a 'better right' over that property. Once again, this enabled the defendant to raise the jus tertii as a defence and as in the case of land, there has been dispute as to how far this required a plaintiff to prove an absolute right." The Sale of Goods Act 1979 refers to 'the property' in goods, which in this context means ownership' In this regard Sir Raymond Evershed MR has made certain very important observation.[44]

There are few other points where the researcher thinks that he should focus discussion.

·         The term 'ownership' is used with reference to things. It can be of two types (a) 'corporeal' with reference to certain objects, (b) 'incorporeal things' with respect to certain rights. The use of the phrase 'corporeal ownership' with reference to physical objects is simple, and had the term 'incorporeal ownership' embraced all claims that too would have been simple. The term incorporeal ownership applies only to some claims as far as 'things' are concerned not to others, as then it may appear that ownership is incorporeal.[45]

·         Ownership is needed to give effect to the idea of 'mine' and 'not mine' or 'thin.' One aspect of it is that the idea becomes necessary only when there is some relation between persons. It is at least one other person joins him that it becomes necessary to distinguish between things that are his and those that are not his, and also to determine what he may do with his and also to determine what he may do with his things so as not to interfere with his companion. Therefore without the society there is no need of 'ownership.'

·         The right of ownership comprises of benefits and burdens.

·         The claims, which compromise the content of ownership, may be vested in person other than the owner.

·         An owner may be divested of his claims to such extent that he may be left with no immediate practical benefit.

·         The ways in which the ownership arises differ in different systems. These variations depends upon historical and policy consideration. In English law that a contract for sale of specific goods can in certain circumstances pass immediate ownership without the need for any further conveyance. In civil law for the transfer of civil law ownership in certain kinds of things known as resmancipi.

Lastly it may be said that a person is owner under English law when a person becomes entitled in specified ways to something designated as such, the scope of which is determined by policy; and his interest, constituted in this way, will outlast the interests of other persons in the same thing.

7. Conclusion

While analyzing this paper the research has come to certain conclusions. Those are as follows,

·         Ownership consists of an innumerable number of claims, liberties, powers and immunities with regard to the thing owned.

·         According to some jurist a person owns a house means he has just those claims in respect of it. According to them there is no point in having the concept of ownership without these claims. But many jurists have disagreed on this idea of ownership. According to them ownership means a bundle of right.

·         In fact this right includes complete control over a property, this gives the owner a power to alienate and even destroy the property.

·         In ancient Indian concept the property was considered to be of two kind. Jangama (movable) and sthavara (immovable). In the laws relating to the purchase and sale both are considered to be Panya (salable property). There it was said that a person who is the owner of a property, whether movable and immovable, is entitled to transfer his ownership to another person through sale. In ancient time, which is mostly found in smrities is that they used to consider sale as a valid mode of transfer like present time. In fact in India the right of swamitva (ownership) of property as comprising of title to the property with bhakti or bhoga (possession). In Indian concept of ownership the researcher found out that there was a development of & criminal jurisprudence as he has found out that in case of transfer without ownership or fraudulent transfer there was instances where the person was fined. In ancient time property was largely held by major holders like taluk, inam, watan, jagir, and muafi. In India the concept of co-ownership is still well recognized. According to Indian laws co-owner is not allowed to cause prejudice to other co-sharers by putting up a substantial construction during the pendency of a suit. But in case of dwelling house if the co-owner is not in actual possession of the property, then it cannot be transferred. Therefore, it may be concluded that In case of co-owner in India there is no absolute ownership.

·         In western concept there are both corporeal and incorporeal properties. There ownership comprises of benefits and burdens. In western concept of ownership the owner may be divested of his claims to such extent that he may be left with no immediate practical benefit. Though a person who holds any property without owner's concept was considered to be a trespasser. Also in western concept of ownership in some cases there can be a transfer of property without a valid execution of deed.

Therefore Indian and Western concept of ownership can be distinguished in certain points. In India we had concept of movable and immovable property from the ancient time. In western countries they had corporeal and incorporeal property. Though subsequently there has been recognition for both these concepts in other places. But in India there was no valid transfer till today without a proper executed deed, even in Indian concept there has been no recognition of a valid transfer of ownership in case of a settlement deed. But in certain cases in western countries ownership could have been transferred without proper execution of a deed. Also in ancient Indian concept there was a presence of a limited amount of punishment for a fraudulent transfer. Western countries are now adopting this concept of punishment also. The researcher thinks that there should have been a development of new jurisprudence where there is presence of both western and Indian concept of ownership.

Lastly the researcher thinks that with the recognition of intellectual property right there has been a requirement of redefining the concept of ownership because in case of intellectual property the idea of assignment is a sort of transfer of limited ownership, and also the concept of moral right thus required to be revised, as it can be transferred only in certain cases.

References

Books

1. Salmond, “Jurisprudence”, 4^th Edn. Butterworth’s Publications, New Delhi.
2. V.D. Mahajan, “Legal Theory and Justice”, Orient Longman Pub., New Delhi (1991).
3. Holland, “Jurisprudence”, 4^th edn. Sweet & Maxwell Publishers (London).
4. Rama Jois, “Legal and Constituional History”, Universal Law Publishers, New Delhi (1986).

Articles

1. Kunal Chatterjee, “Indian Concept of ownership”, AIR 2004 Journal 222
2. “Ownership”, Great Books.
3. Articles on Jurisprudential concept of property, Course material on Property Law–I, National Law Institute University, Bhopal.

Statutes

1. Constitution of India
2. Transfer of Property Act, 1882
3. Sale of Goods Act, 1930

Websites

1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.courtnic.nic.in
3. www.lawmin.nic.in
4. www.infochangenews.com

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[1] It should also be remembered that there are such expressions as ‘limited ownership’, but these, as will appear, refer to special types of interest.

[2] V.D. Mahajan, “Legal Theory and Justice”, p.324

[3] ibid.

[4] Supra note.2 at p. 325

[5] (1878) 4 Ex D 5

[6] Holland on Jurisprudence at p.226.

[7] Supra note.2 at p.327

[8] Jurisprudence and legal essays, at pp.97-98

[9] Salmond, “Jurisprudence”, P.328.

[10] Supra note.2 at 326.

[11] Supra note.2 at p.335

[12] Supra note.2 at p.335

[13] Jurisprudence by BISWAS

[14] Section 6 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

[15] AIR 1932 Cal 600

[16] See “Legal Theory” by Biswas 5^th Ed., pp.159-161

[17] Ibid.

[18] Rama Jois, “Legal and Constitutional History”, p.287

[19] Ibid

[20] Ibid.

[21] By learning, by purchase, by mortgage, by valour (Kshatriyas), through wife, by inheritance, by succession.

[22] Goods as defined under Section 2(7), in so far is it relates to movable property, and the meaning of word sale in section 4 of Sale of Goods Act, 1930, carry substantially the same meaning as meant by panyaand kraya respectively.

[23] Supra note.18

[24] Narada Smriti at p. 145

[25] Katyayan Smriti pp.621-623

[26] Sacred Books of East, Manu. VII.197, Vol.25^th at p.289

[27] Sacred books of east, Manu, VII, 200, Vol.25^th at p.290.

[28] Keshavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala, AIR 1973 SC 1461.

[29] Ibid. Para 399

[30] Genarally Annand v. Govt. of India Act, 1935 at p.501.

[31] Ibid at 500.

[32] Ibid. at 500

[33] Dual Ownership – If an open site is leased out and the lesse build on the said site site leased out to him. By vitue of the doctrine of sual ownership, the lesse is the owner of the building apart from the site and if he lets out the building, he cannot be said to have sub-lat the same. The doctrine would, however, be not applicable if the lease permitted the lesse to build but prohibited the transfer of the building by sale or sub-lease – West’s Patent Press v. Govindnaik AIR 1984 NOC 274

[34] Bai Dosabai v. Mathuradas Govind Das AIR 1980 SC 1334

[35] Chhatra Kumari v. Mohan Bikaram, AIR 1931 PC 774

[36] Inder Sein v. Naubt (1885) ILR All 553

[37] Jadu Nath v. Rup Lal, (1906) ILR 33 Cal 967

[38] Mathura Mohan v. Ram Kumar, AIR 1916 Cal 136.

[39] (1910) ILR 34 Bom 139

[40] Baldev v. Darshani Devi AIR 1993 HP 141

[41] Biswas, “Modern Jurisprudence”, P.539

[42] Salmond on Jurisprudence at p.300

[43] Pollock and Maitland History of English Law II, at p.153n.

[44] Although it is no doubt, true in a sense, and certainty in its original medival conception, that one speaks of property in chattels is now well understood.

[45]