Tuesday, November 5, 2013


Powers of the Wakf Board inter alia to sanction any transfer of Wakf Property:

 
  • Section 32 of the Wakf Act stipulates the Powers and Functions of the Wakf Board inter alia for maintenance, control, administration etc of the wakf properties, income etc. Section 32 reads as under:
 
32. Powers and functions of the Board. (1) Subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, the general superintendence of all Wakfs in a State shall vest in the Board established or the State; and it shall be the duty of the Baord so to exercise its powers under the Act so as to ensure that the Wakfs under the superintendence are properly maintained, controlled and administered and the income thereof is duly applied to the objects and for the purposes for which such Wakfs were created or intended:

………..

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, the functions of the Board shall be:-

……..

(j) to sanction any transfer of immovable property of a Wakf by way of sale, gift, mortgage, exchange or elase, in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

            Provided that no such sanction shall be given unless at least two-thirds of the members of the Board vote in favour of such transaction……”


  • In view of the above, Wakf Board alone has the power to sanction any transfer of the Wakf property and the procedure and manner of according such sanction is enshrined under Section 51 of the Wakf Act.

 Alienation of Wakf Property under the Wakf Act and Rules:

 
  • As per Section 51 of the Wakf Act, the Wakf Property can be alienated only with the prior sanction of the Board. The said section provides that, before according a valid sanction to a transaction, including a sale of the Wakf property, the proposed transaction should be notified in the Official Gazette for purposes of inviting objections and suggestions. After considering the objections and suggestions as may be received pursuant to such notification and on being convinced that such transaction is beneficial to the Wakf, is consistent with the objects thereof and the consideration for the same is also adequate, the Wakf Board may accord sanction to the proposed transaction.

  • Further, for a valid sanction, alteast two-thirds of the members of the Wakf Board should vote in favour of such transaction as provided under Clause j of sub-section 2 of Section 32 of the Wakf Act. Further, as per Rule 12 (1) of the A.P. Wakf Rules, 2000, the sanction accorded by the Wakf Board under Section 51 of the Act would be subject to the prior approval of the State Government and such directions as may be issued under Section 97 of the Wakf Act. However, Section 97 of the Act does not empower the State Government either to relax or to give a go-bye to the mandatory provisions of Section 51 or to accord permission to sale of Wakf land otherwise than by way of public auction. The Court has held that neither the Wakf Board nor the Government has the power to permit the sale of immovable property otherwise than by public auction and it is the only the Tribunal which is empowered to grant such permission[1].  

  • As per the first proviso to Section 51 (2) of the Act, the sale of the Wakf property is ordinarily required to be by public auction, however, the second proviso to Section 51(2) carves out an exception to the first proviso and states that, the Wakf Tribunal, on application from the aggrieved Muttawalli or other person may permit such sale to be made otherwise than by public auction for reasons to be recorded by it, if it is of opinion that it is necessary so to do in the interest of the Wakf.

In view of the above, for valid sale of a Wakf property, the Wakf Board has to accord its sanction in terms of Section 51 of the Act and also an approval is required to be sought from the State Government, prior to the actual sale, in terms of Rule 12(1) of the A.P. Wakf Rules. Alienation of any Wakf Land in contravention to the procedure laid down under Section 51 renders the transaction void.

 
Acquisition of Wakf Land

 
  • The land as defined under Section 3(a) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 does not in any manner excludes Wakf land and moreover such acquisition if for public purpose cannot be considered as violation of fundamental right to religion and worship under the Constitution of India.[2] It may be noted that the Wakf Lands can be subject matter of land acquisition[3] provided the said acquisition process is in compliance with the provisions of Section 91 of the Wakf Act. Section 91 of the Wakf Act reads as under:

91. Proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894:- (1) If, in the course of proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act 1894 or under any law for the time being in force relating to the acquisition of land or other property, it appears to the Collector before an award is made that any property under acquisition is wakf property, a notice of such acquisition shall be served by Collector on the Board and further proceedings shall be stayed to enable the Board to appear and plead as a party to the proceeding at any time within three months from the date of the receipt of such notice. Explanation.- The reference to the Collector in the foregoing provisions of this sub- section shall, in relation to any other law referred to therein, be construed, if the Collector is not the competent authority under such other law to make an award of the compensation or other amount payable for acquisition of land or other property thereunder, as a reference to the authority under such other law competent to make such award.

(2) Where the Board has reason to believe that any property under acquisition is wakf property, it may at any time before the award is made appear and plead as a party to the proceeding.

(3) When the Board has appeared under the provisions of sub- section (1) or sub- section (2), no order shall be passed under section 31 or section 32 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or under the corresponding provisions of the other law referred to in sub- section (1) without giving an opportunity to the Board to be heard.

(4) Any order passed under section 31 or section 32 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or under the corresponding provisions of the other law referred to in sub- section (1) without giving an opportunity to the Board to be heard, shall be declared void if the Board, within one month of its coming to know of the order, applies in this behalf to the authority which made the order.”

 
  • Section 91 of the Wakf Act protects the interest of the Wakf Board in respect of such Wakf properties which are likely to be acquired by the Collector in course of the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It, therefore, requires that whenever it appears to collector that any property under acquisition is a Wakf property, he shall serve a notice on the Wakf Board before making any award and shall stay further proceedings in order to enable the Wakf Board to appear and plead as a party to such proceedings at any time within 3 months from the date of receipt of such notice. While complying with the provisions of Wakf Act, the State Government and District Collector must also follow the procedure laid down under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 during the process of land acquisition.

 Relevant Clause under Wakf (Amendment) Bill, 2010:

 
  • Clause 27 of the Wakf (Amendment) Bill, 2010 seeks to amend Section 51 of the principal Act i.e Wakf Act, 1995 which also deals with the aspect of acquisition of Wakf property for public purpose. Though this is yet to be passed by the Parliament and become an Act, for the purpose of your information, relevant portion of the said clause 27 is reproduced as under and reliance on this cannot be placed till the same is not culminated into the Act:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect any acquisition of waqf properties for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 or any other law relating to acquisition of land:

Provided further that —

(a) the acquisition shall not be in contravention of the Places of Public Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991;

(b) the purpose for which the land is being acquired shall be undisputedly for a public purpose;

(c) there shall be no alternative land being available which shall be considered as more or less suitable for that purpose; and

(d) the compensation shall be the prevailing market value plus the solatium and a equally suitable land in lieu of the acquired property to safeguard adequately the interest and objective of the waqf.’’



[1] M. Govinda Rao & Ors. vs. A.P. State Wakf Board & Ors, 2008(2) ALD 188
[2] Khajamia Wakf Estates v. State of Madras, AIR 1971 SC 161
[3] The Revenue Divisional Officer, Nalgonda v.A.P. State Wakf Board and Others, 2013 (1) ALD 744; Mohammad Azkar Hussain And Anr. v. Collector Of Shahabad And Ors., AIR 1960 Pat 144; Mohammed Ali Khan v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Lucknow Nagar Mahapalika, Lucknow & Ors.., AIR 1978 All 280

Law of Liquidated Damages and Penalty

 

Relevant Provisions under the Indian Contract Act, 1972:

 

Section 73 - Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach of it.

 

Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach. Compensation for failure to discharge obligation resembling those created by contract

 

Section 74 - Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for - When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for.

Explanation.- A stipulation for increased interest from the date of default may be a stipulation by way of penalty.

 

Under Section 74 of the Contract Act, the party claiming breach of contract is entitled to receive reasonable compensation whether or not actual loss is proved to have been caused by such breach. In view of the ruling in ONGC vs. Saw Pipes, wherever there is a pre-determined amount for the damages, in such a situation the said amount can be deducted by way of liquidated damages by way of specified amount payable by the respondent. Thus, if the compensation is named in the contract by way of penalty, consideration would be different and the party is only entitled to reasonable compensation for the loss suffered. But if the compensation named in the contract for such breach is genuine pre-estimate of loss which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it, there is no question of proving such loss or such party is not required to lead evidence to prove actual loss suffered by him.

 

The above provisions enact principles upon which damages are to be awarded by the Courts in India for breach of contracts. There are obvious differences between the two provisions. Section 73 outlines the general principles for the award of damages, which is the difference between the price or cost of the goods or services contracted for as on the date of breach, which the injured party would be entitled to. In such an instance, the injured party would have to prove the breach (of contract); the value, cost or price of the goods or services contracted for on the date of breach and the measures taken by it towards mitigation of damages. Section 74, on the other hand, dispenses with the requirement of proving actual damage once breach of contract is established, the Court is enabled to award the “reasonable compensation” not exceeding the amount specified in the contract or the amounts which can be arrived at on application of the formulae or method prescribed in the contract.

 

Case Laws:

 

1.         The Supreme Court, in Fateh Chand v. Bal Kishan Das AIR 1963 SC 1405 called Section 74 as the provision cutting through the maze of rules evolved by English Courts over a period of time to distinguish between what is considered a genuine pre-determination of damages and what is penalty and, therefore, not enforceable. The Court held as follows: -

 

10. Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act deals with the measure of damages in two classes of cases (i) where the contract names a sum to be paid in case of breach and (ii) where the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty. We are in the present case not concerned to decide whether a contract containing a covenant of forfeiture of deposit for due performance of a contract falls within the first class. The measure of damages in the case of breach of a stipulation by way of penalty is by Section 74 reasonable compensation not exceeding the penalty stipulated for. In assessing damages the Court has, subject to the limit of the penalty stipulated, jurisdiction to award such compensation as it deems reasonable having regard to all the circumstances of the case. Jurisdiction of the Court to award compensation in case of breach of contract is unqualified except as to the maximum stipulated; but compensation has to be reasonable, and that imposes upon the Court duty to award compensation according to settled principles. The section undoubtedly says that the aggrieved party is entitled to receive compensation from the party who has broken the contract, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused by the breach. Thereby it merely dispenses with proof of “actual loss or damage”; it does not justify the award of compensation when in consequence of the breach no legal injury at all has resulted, because compensation for breach of contract can be awarded to make good loss or damage which naturally arose in the usual course of things, or which the parties knew when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the breach.

 

15. Section 74 declares the law as to liability upon breach of contract where compensation is by agreement of the parties pre-determined, or where there is a stipulation by way of penalty. But the application of the enactment is not restricted to cases where the aggrieved party claims relief as a plaintiff. The section does not confer a special benefit upon any party; it merely declares the law that notwithstanding any term in the contract predetermining damages or providing for forfeiture of any property by way of penalty, the court will award to the party aggrieved only reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount named or penalty stipulated. The jurisdiction of the court is not determined by the accidental circumstance of the party in default being a plaintiff or a defendant in a suit. Use of the expression “to receive from the party who has broken the contract” does not predicate that the jurisdiction of the court to adjust amounts which have been paid by the party in default cannot be exercised in dealing with the claim of the party complaining of breach of contract. The court has to adjudge in every case reasonable compensation to which the plaintiff is entitled from the defendant on breach of the contract. Such compensation has to be ascertained having regard to the conditions existing on the date of the breach.

 

16. There is no evidence that any loss was suffered by the plaintiff in consequence of the default by the defendant, save as to the loss suffered by him by being kept out of possession of the property. There is no evidence that the property had depreciated in value since the date of the contract provided; nor was there evidence that any other special damage had resulted. The contact provided for forfeiture of Rs 25,000 consisting of Rs, 1039 paid as earnest money and Rs 24,000 paid as part of the purchase price. The defendant has conceded that the plaintiff was entitled to forfeit the amount of Rs 1000 which was paid as earnest money. We cannot however agree with the High Court that 13 percent of the price may be regarded as reasonable compensation in relation to the value of the contract as a whole, as that in our opinion is assessed on an arbitrary assumption. The plaintiff failed to prove the loss suffered by him in consequence of the breach of the contract committed by the defendant and we are unable to find any principle on which compensation equal to ten percent of the agreed price could be awarded to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has been allowed Rs 1000 which was the earnest money as part of the damages. Besides he had use of the remaining sum of Rs 24,000, and we can rightly presume that he must have been deriving advantage from that amount throughout this period. In the absence therefore of any proof of damage arising from the breach of the contract, we are of opinion that the amount of Rs 1000 (earnest money) which has been forfeited, and the advantage that the plaintiff must have derived from the possession of the remaining sum of Rs 24,000 during all this period would be sufficient compensation to him. It may be added that the plaintiff has separately claimed mesne profits for being kept out possession for which he has got a decree and therefore the fact that the plaintiff was out of possession cannot be taken, into account in determining damages for this purpose. The decree passed by the High Court awarding Rs 11,250 as damages to the plaintiff must therefore be set aside.”

 

2.         In the case of Maula Bux v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 1955, the Supreme Court rejected the contention that quantified amounts spelt out in a contract for supply of potatoes to the Central Government, were, in the circumstances of the case, genuine pre-determination of what the damages were likely to be and held that such conditions were unenforceable penalties. The Court also noticed that that the Central Government did not make any effort to establish the quantum of damage suffered by it. It approved the previous ruling in Fateh Chand case.

 

3.         Similarly, in M.L. Devendra Singh v. Syed Khaja 1973 (2) SCC 515 (affirmed in P. D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu,(2004) 6 SCC 649) the Court accepted the same approach and further emphasized that mere stipulation of some amount would only be a piece of evidence, but inconclusive by its very nature:

 

"20. The fact that the parties themselves have provided a sum to be paid by the party breaking the contract does not, by itself, remove the strong presumption contemplated by the use of the words „unless and until the contrary is proved. The sufficiency or insufficiency of any evidence to remove such a presumption is a matter of evidence. The fact that the parties themselves specified a sum of money to be paid in the event of its breach is, no doubt, a piece of evidence to be considered in deciding whether the presumption has been repelled or not. But, in our opinion, it is nothing more than a piece of evidence. It is not conclusive or decisive.”

 

4.         In Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd v. Saw Pipes Ltd. AIR 2003 SC 2629, the Hon’ble Supreme Court inter alia observed as under:

           

From the aforesaid Sections, it can be held that when a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive compensation for any loss which naturally arise in the usual course of things from such breach. These sections further contemplate that if parties knew when they made the contract that a particular loss is likely to result from such breach, they can agree for payment of such compensation. In such a case, there may not be any necessity of leading evidence for proving damages, unless the Court arrives at the conclusion that no loss is likely to occur because of such breach. Further, in case where Court arrives at the conclusion that the term contemplating damages is by way of penalty, the Court may grant reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named in the contract on proof of damages. however, when the terms of the contract are clear and unambiguous then its meaning is to be gathered only from the words used therein. In a case where agreement is executed by experts in the field, it would be difficult to hold that the intention of the parties was different from the language used therein. In such a case, it is for the party who contends that stipulated amount is not reasonable compensation, to prove the same.”        

           

Further, in the aforesaid case, the Court summarized the legal position as follows

“(1) Terms of the contract are required to be taken into consideration before arriving at the conclusion whether the party claiming damages is entitled to the same.

(2) If the terms are clear and unambiguous stipulating the liquidated damages in case of the breach of the contract unless it is held that such estimate of damages/compensation is unreasonable or is by way of penalty, party who has committed the breach is required to pay such compensation and that is what is provided in Section 73 of the Contract Act.

(3) Section 74 is to be read along with Section 73 and, therefore, in every case of breach of contract, the person aggrieved by the breach is not required to prove actual loss or damage suffered by him before he can claim a decree. The court is competent to award reasonable compensation in case of breach even if no actual damage is proved to have been suffered in consequence of the breach of a contract.

(4) In some contracts, it would be impossible for the court to assess the compensation arising from breach and if the compensation contemplated is not by way of penalty or unreasonable, the court can award the same if it is genuine preestimate by the parties as the measure of reasonable compensation.

 

In view of the above, a penal clause in an agreement has been characterized as a stipulation unreasonable which the courts would refuse to recognize, or give effect to. This necessarily implies that the amount of damages far exceeds what can be “reasonable compensation” in the given facts of the case. However, the Court would not, unless it is convinced that such condition far exceeds the genuine estimate of reasonable damages, interdict with the penalty condition, which the parties have agreed to include in the contract.

Friday, October 11, 2013


Criminal Liability in Medical Negligence
Saving the Scalpel: Re-affirming the Hippocratic Oath
 

1.  INTRODUCTION


 
The paper has been painstakingly prepared and designed under three broad heads. This is an upshot of the landmark judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Dr. Suresh Gupta v. Government of N.C.T. New Delhi and Anr in August 2004. The judgment briefly says that the doctors cannot be held criminally liable for error of judgment but can only be liable for gross negligence under section 304-A of the IPC. This judgment is a great sigh of relief to the whole medical fraternity of India.

 

Under the first content, there is an elaborative description on the negligence under the Indian Penal Code (Sec.304-A) with special reference to the acts of medical practitioners.

 

Under the second content, there is a brief note on the instant case with its facts, reasoning and the decision of the division bench. Under the same debate of Supreme Court’s judgment, it is further discussed about concept of mens rea under medical negligence by citing a series of case law.

 

Finally, in the light of discussion on above aspects regarding medical negligence and criminal liability, it is concluded that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has led to an implied amendment in the wordings of Section 304-A of the IPC by incorporation of terms ‘error of judgment’ and ‘gross negligence’.

 

2.  NEGLIGENCE UNDER THE INDIAN PENAL CODE
Vis-à-vis MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS


“It is common knowledge that the intention of a man will not be probed, for the devil does not know a man's intention."

-Brian, C.J.

He who commits a wrong is said to be liable or responsible for it. The wrong may be in the form of an act or an omission. The essential distinction between crimes and civil wrongs is that crimes are considered public wrongs, which are a breach and violation of public rights, and duties, which affect the whole community and is distinguished by the harsher term crime or misdemeanor whereas civil wrongs are considered violations of rights that belong to the individual and are termed civil injuries.

Remedy for the wrong may thus be civil or criminal. However, there are some wrongs for which the remedy may be both civil and criminal (defamation, negligence and some other wrongs). Under the criminal law, liability is always penal. In penal liability, the purpose of the law, is, or includes punishment of the wrongdoer. Under civil liability, the law leaves the victim to sue for compensation, by way of damages. Negligence is one of the wrongs for which the law gives a remedy both under the civil law and the criminal law.

It is important for a medical practitioner to remember that there can be no civil action for negligence if the negligent act or omission has not been attended by an injury to any person; but bare negligence involving the risk of injury is punishable criminally, though nobody is actually hurt by it. Example a patient is operated upon in an operation theater without oxygen being available; the medical practitioner would be liable under the criminal law even though the patient may not have needed oxygen. The mere act of exposing the patient to the risk of personal safety or life is enough to bring criminal negligence into play.

From a practical viewpoint, the importance of distinguishing whether negligence is civil or criminal lies in the fact that action for redress to a patient against a medical practitioner would lie under different systems of justice. Civil justice is administered by one set of courts (civil courts, and now, in consumer forums) whereas criminal justice is administered in a somewhat different set of courts (Magistrate's of the First Class). Civil proceedings, if successful, result in a judgment for payment of compensation whereas criminal proceedings, if successful, result in punishments, which include imprisonment, fine, or both. Thus the basic objective of criminal proceedings is punishment and the usual goal of civil proceedings is non-punitive (compensatory).

The general condition of penal liability is indicated by the Latin maxim- Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea- the act alone does not amount to guilt; it must be accompanied by a guilty mind (mens rea). Thus two conditions need to be fulfilled before penal responsibility can be rightly imposed. The one is the doing of some act (read act/omission) by the person held to be liable. The other is the mens rea or guilty mind with which the act is done. Thus, before the law can justly punish a criminal act, an inquiry must be made into the mental attitude of the doer for although the act may have been objectively wrongful, the mind of the doer may have been innocent. The mental attitude of the medical practitioner would thus have to concur with the wrongful act before he could be prosecuted successfully under the criminal law.

To attribute mens rea to a wrongful act it is necessary that the act be done either willfully or recklessly. Where the act is willful, mens rea is easy to attribute to the wrongful act since the mind has acted in concert with the wrongful act. A reckless act (read negligently or rashly) is one where the person is responsible for consequences foreseen as the certain or highly probable outcome of his act. However there are two qualifications- Firstly, criminal law may include provisions penalizing negligence even though this may result from mere inadvertence. Secondly, the law may create offenses of strict liability. We are concerned with the first qualification since the Indian Penal Code creates this liability.

This liability under the Indian Penal Code is created on the assumption of foreseeability of consequences, which could result from a wrongful act. Thus if a medical practitioner, does an act which he did not intend or even foresee, but which a reasonable medical practitioner would have foreseen under similar circumstances as likely to cause death, he would be held guilty of the wrongful act. Here foreseen and foreseeable consequences are put on the same footing as consequences which are intended.

Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 336, 337 and 338 are the only section under the criminal law which deals with professional negligence-the short title of Section 304-A reads 'Causing death by negligence'. The complete section is: "Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both".

The provisions of the section would come into play only when death occurs. No injury short of death would make a medical practitioner liable under this section. Also, the provision comes into effect when there in no intention to cause death, and no knowledge that the act done in all probability would cause death (culpable homicide). When the act is in its nature criminal, the section has no application. The section does not apply when death has resulted from some supervening event which could not have been anticipated, but will only apply when death is the result of the rash or negligent act as its direct or proximate cause.

Criminal rashness means hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so, and that it may cause injury but without intention to cause injury or knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences. Example a medical practitioner performing termination of pregnancy in its sixth month. Here the medical practitioner is aware (knowledge) or should be aware that termination of pregnancy in its sixth month is dangerous but still performs termination though he may not intend to cause death of the patient or have the requisite knowledge that death would probably be caused.

Criminal negligence is the gross or culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable or proper care and precaution to guard against injury, which, was the imperative duty of the professional to adopt. Example a medical practitioner conducts termination of an eight-week pregnancy but does so without adequate training or with unspecialized instruments. Here the medical practitioner has not exercised the caution incumbent upon him to undertake termination only after adequate training in the procedure and only with sterilized instruments in an adequately equipped set up.

  

3.  DEBATE ON THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT’S JUDGEMENT OF AUGUST 2004

(A Critique of Dr.Suresh Gupta v. Govt. of N.C.T. of  Delhi and Anr.)

On Friday, 6th August 2004 the only discussion that took place in the bar room of most courts and offices of consumer organisations was the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s decision to let doctors ‘off the hook’ in criminal complaints filed against them.

In the judgment[1] that would relieve the entire medical fraternity, the Supreme Court has ruled that if a patient dies due to an error of judgment committed by the doctor, then he is not criminally liable though could have to pay damages.

This judgment was given by a Bench comprising Justice YK Sabharwal and Justice DM Dharmadhikari while quashing criminal proceedings against a plastic surgeon who faced trial for criminal charges for causing death of a person who had wanted to remove a minor deformity in his nose.

The Bench said for fixing criminal liability on a doctor or surgeon, the standard of negligence required to be proved should be so high as could be described as "gross negligence" or "reckless".

"It is not merely lack of necessary care, attention and skill," the Bench said and added, "When a patient agrees to go for medical treatment or surgical operation, every careless act of the medical man cannot be termed as 'criminal'." Justice Dharmadhikari, writing for the Bench, said it could be termed 'criminal' only when the medical man exhibited a gross lack of competence or inaction and wanton indifference to his patient's safety and which is found to have arisen from gross ignorance or gross negligence.

"Where a patient's death results merely from error of judgement or an accident, no criminal liability should be attached to it," the apex Court said "Mere inadvertence or some degree of want of adequate care and caution might create civil liability but would not suffice to hold him criminally liable," it added.

Dr Suresh Gupta of Delhi was facing charges under Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code for causing death of the patient. He had conducted an operation to remove nasal deformity on April 18, 1994 but the patient died on the same day.

According to the post-mortem report conducted after three days, the cause of the death was "blockage of respiratory passage by aspirated blood consequent upon surgically incised margin of nasal septum".

From the post-mortem report and the opinion of the three medical experts of the medical team specially constituted, the case of the prosecution laid against the surgeon was that there was negligence in "not putting a cuffed endo-tracheal tube of proper size" and in a manner so as to prevent aspiration of blood blocking respiratory passage.

The Bench said the approach of the trial courts in such cases should be such that if a doctor did not give proper or adequate care to the patient, he should be liable for damages.

"This approach of the courts in the matter of fixing criminal liability on doctors, in the course of medical treatment given to their patients, is necessary so that the hazards of medical men in medical profession being exposed to civil liability, may not unreasonably extend to criminal liability and expose them to risk of landing themselves in prison for alleged criminal negligence," the apex Court said.

A Series Of Case Law On Medical Negligence Under IPC

For many vested interests, a very important weapon in their arsenal suddenly was defunct and this for them was a major cause of concern. All concerned were aware that the pronouncement was not new and criminal law could not be routinely applied to the medical practitioner but the main grouse was the publicity that the press and the television gave to this pronouncement, which now made their threats of a criminal complaint and imprisonment a non- entity.

Police complaints and criminal litigations have time and again been used to ‘soften’ the medical practitioners to coax them to agree to a hefty out-of-court settlement. Medical practitioner’s ignorance of law was capitalised upon and fear was used as a key to illegal enrichment both by litigants and the competent authorities, but thanks to the wide spread publicity, things are soon going to change much to the dislike of many.

The duty to take the requisite care and caution while treating a patient is a duty cast both under the civil law as well as the criminal law. The courts in R Vs Prentice and Sullman[2] and in R Vs Adomako[3] have settled the law as to how to determine criminal negligence in medical practice. The following is the test to bring home the charge of criminal negligence in medical negligence as settled in R Vs Adomako[4]

(a) Indifference to an obvious risk of injury to health

(b) Actual foresight of the risk coupled with the determination nevertheless to run it

(c) An appreciation of the risk coupled with an intention to avoid it, but the attempted avoidance involves a very high degree of negligence and

 (d) Inattention to a serious risk which goes beyond ‘mere inadvertence’ in respect of an obvious and important matter which the doctor’s duty demanded, he should address.

In short, the settled law is that the prosecution must prove

(i)                 the existence of duty to take care;

(ii)                a breach of duty causing death; and

(iii)              the breach of duty must be characterised as gross negligence. Whether the doctor’s breach of duty amounted to gross negligence, depended on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by him in all the circumstances in which he was placed when the breach occurred.

Furthermore what must also be considered is whether, having regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the doctor was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount to a criminal act or omission. The test for recklessness formulated by Lord Diplock in R Vs Lawrence[5];, is that the doctor having recognised the risk had nevertheless gone on to take it.

This criterion of recklessness is based upon the premise that the doctor himself created the obvious and serious risk. Often the risk of danger to health is not created by the doctor, but pre-exists the doctor assuming a duty of care to the patient. It is thus, clear that the doctor must be proved to have been indifferent to an obvious risk of injury to health, or has actually so foreseen the risk but determined nevertheless to run it.

Death due to medical negligence is an offence, which can be agitated both in the criminal court, under the Indian Penal Code or in the consumer court under the relevant sections of the Consumer Protection Act or alternatively the same may also be agitated in the civil courts under the Law of Torts. Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code deals with death caused by a rash or negligent act.

Whenever there is death due to negligence of a doctor, the State always books the doctor under s 304A of the Indian Penal Code and not under section 302. The law in this regard was laid down by the Supreme Court of India in Juggankhan Vs State of Madhya Pradesh[6].

Similarly in Dr Khusaldas Pammandas Vs State of MP[7], the Indore Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court held a registered hakim guilty for committing an offence under s. 304A of IPC. The court held that gross rashness and negligence could be inferred when a person undertakes a treatment or performs an operation, when he is totally ignorant of the science of medicine or practice of surgery. Since the hakim registered under section 46 of the Madhya Bharat Indian Medicines Act 1952, had no knowledge whatsoever of penicillin injection treatment, his act of giving procaine penicillin injection to the deceased would be clearly rash and negligent within the meaning of s 304A of IPC.

In Dr Ajit Kaur v State of Punjab[8] the criminal proceeding against the medical practitioner for committing an offence under

section 304A of IPC was quashed by Punjab and Haryana High Court on the ground that the action of the medical practitioner was not even proximately the cause of death of the baby which was born as a result of induced delivery.

In Ghanshyamdas Bhagwandas v State of MP[9] the deceased was on old patient of bronchial asthma. The doctor injected coramine and thereafter patient expired. In the absence of any evidence to establish direct nexus between the death of the patient and the rash act of injecting coramine by the doctor, the criminal liability of the doctor was not established.

In State of Gujarat Vs Dr Maltiben Valjibhai Shah[10], the deceased Ranjanbala went to the clinic of Dr M V Shah for treatment, for sinusitis and hypertension. The doctor gave a test dose to Ranjanbala and then she was given injection bistrepen half gram IM. After giving the injection the patient immediately complained of giddiness, pain in chest, perspiration and her pulse was rapid.

When reaction was noticed by the doctor, she immediately gave a number of injections to counter the reaction. The trial court held the doctor guilty of charge under section 304A, IPC and awarded simple imprisonment for seven days and a fine of Rs 1000 and in default simple imprisonment for seven days. The High Court of Gujarat acquitted the doctor of the charge under section 304A, IPC on appeal, on the grounds that the deceased did not react to test dose of procaine penicillin injection, and that the doctor after noticing reaction of the regular dose of injection, gave immediately a number of injections as anti-reaction treatment.

Criminal liability in medical practice has been discussed in great detail in Dr Krishna Prasad Vs State of Karnataka[11] by Justice Kulkarni. In this case the patient was admitted for a delivery in the nursing home. The doctor decided caesarean operation under spinal anesthesia.

The blood pressure began to fall soon after administering spinal anaesthesia and ultimately the patient died. The criminal proceeding against the anesthetist was started on the allegation that he was not an anaesthetic expert and that the test dose of spinal xylocaine injection was not given to the patient.

The Karnataka High Court quashed the criminal proceeding on the grounds that the doctor holding degrees like MBBS, FRCS, and DGO is qualified to administer anaesthesia and that the omission to give test dose of spinal xylocaine does not amount to rashness or negligence.

Rashness and negligence are not the same things. Negligence cannot be construed to mean rashness. There are different degrees of negligence and rashness. In order to amount to criminal rashness or criminal negligence the courts must find out that the rashness has been of such a degree as to amount to taking a hazard knowing that the hazard was of such a degree that injury was most likely to be occasioned thereby. The criminality lies in running the risk or doing such an act with recklessness and indifference to the consequences.

The question whether the accused’s conduct amounted to culpable rashness or negligence depends directly on the question as to what is the amount of care and circumspection which a prudent and reasonable man would consider it to be sufficient considering all the circumstances of the case[12].

Moreover, in applying the above criterion it is necessary to avoid being influenced by the prejudice arising out of the loss of a life which is so dominant a factor in accident cases. The distinction between the negligence which is sufficient ground for a civil action and the higher degree which is necessary in criminal proceedings is sharply insisted on in several cases.

Medical Negligence And Mens Rea

In criminal cases, the amount and degree of negligence are the determining factors. There must be presence of mens rea in the criminal negligence also. In order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that the negligence of the accused sent the case beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime. Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough.

The duty of a medical man, who undertakes the treatment of a patient, is to use a fair and reasonable standard of care and competence. Before a medical man can be held criminally responsible for the death of his patient, the prosecution must prove all matters necessary to establish civil liability, except pecuniary loss, and in addition must prove negligence or incompetence on his part which went beyond a mere matter of compensation between citizens and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State.

Where a doctor prepared an injection by dissolving some powder in water which he gave to fifty-seven children of whom five died and others were made ill, it was held that negligence, to be criminal, must be gross and that the only negligence on which reliance could be placed being the single act of dissolving the powder in water, a criminal degree of negligence had not been proved merely because too strong a mixture had once been dispensed and a number of children made gravely ill.[13]

Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and mischievous effect will follow, but in the circumstances, which show that the actor has not exercised the caution, incumbent upon him, and that if he had, he would have had the consciousness. The imputability arises from the neglect of the civic duty of circumspection. It is manifest that personal injury, consciously and intentionally caused, cannot fall within either of these categories which are wholly inapplicable to the case of an act or series of acts, themselves intended, which are the direct producers of death.[14]

Following this, in the well-known case of Empress of India Vs Idu Beg[15], Straight J observed:

“Criminal rashness is hazarding a dangerous or wanton act with the knowledge that it is so and that it may cause injury, but without intention to cause injury or without knowledge that it will probably be caused. The criminality lies in running the risk of doing such an act with recklessness or indifference as to the consequences.

Criminal negligence is the gross and culpable neglect or failure to exercise that reasonable and proper care and precaution to guard against injury either to the public generally, or to an individual in particular, which, having regard to all the circumstances, out of which the charge has arisen, it was the imperative duty of the accused person to have adopted’,” Nelson has further on the same page mentioned: “When one does an act with utter indifference to the consequences of which the doer may be conscious and which, he knows, may not take place, one is said to be rash while criminal negligence is neglect to take that precaution which a reasonable and prudent person is expected to take under the circumstances obtaining in a given case.”

 “Negligence is the failure to take reasonable care and the degree of the reasonable care is not to be measured by any abstract standard. Negligence does not mean absolute carelessness or indifference, but want of such a degree of care as is required in particular circumstances.”[16]

”This section, then, does not apply to cases in which there has been a voluntary commission of an offence against the person. If a man intentionally commits such an offence and consequences beyond his immediate purpose result, it is for the court to determine how far he can be held to have the knowledge that he was likely, by such act, to cause the actual result. If such knowledge can be imputed, the result cannot be attributed to mere rashness: if it cannot be imputed, still the willful offence does not take the character of rashness, because its consequences have been unforeseen.”[17]

 
 
4. CONCLUSION

In the recent Dr Suresh Gupta Vs Government of NCT of Delhi (Criminal Appeal Number 778/2004) case the Hon’ble Supreme Court further reinforced the law settled by their predecessors. Justices Y K Sabharwal and D M Dharmadhikari quashed criminal proceedings against the plastic surgeon for allegedly causing death of a person whilst correcting a minor nose deformity.

The Judges in the judgment said that for fixing criminal liability on a doctor or a surgeon, the standard of negligence required to be proved should be so high as could be described as “gross negligence” or “recklessness”. But, in the instant case, the anaesthetist had not put a cuffed endotracheal tube as the result of which blood trickled into the lungs causing death. The anaesthetist expired during the proceedings and a four member expert committee held the case against the plastic surgeon by 3:1.

The Judges further said:” Where a patient’s death results merely from an error of judgment or an accident, no criminal liability should be attached to it. Mere inadvertence or some degree of want of adequate care and caution might create civil liability, but will not suffice to hold him criminally liable.” But the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment has neither categorically made the distinction between error of judgement and gross negligence nor laid down the tests for determining the two.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the doctor was “careless” but not so “grossly negligent to make him criminally liable.”

In this context, everyone shall recite one statement. If the doctor had made criminally liable in this case, then the doctors would be scared of taking the cases, which will finally result in to death of the poor patients in India.

However, because of this judgment, after a very long time, doctors all over the country can now sleep peacefully without fear of the police knocking at their doors. This is a great sigh of relief to the whole Indian medical fraternity. Besides this, henceforth the doctors may easily claim every negligent act as an error of judgment under the garb of this judgment.

Further, it is submitted that if the treatment is successful, the doctor looks like a miracle man. When it doesn't, it is hard for those affected to accept that it was possible to make a mistake. And if that mistake - inadvertent as it may be - leads to death, it becomes near impossible to ccome to terms to it.People want to be sure justice is done if they believe the doctor has been negligent.

Compensation for the mistake is addressed through civil action, while justice – the doctor going to jail for what he has done – is served through criminal courts. However, criminal liability for doctors is a gray area. Basically, any human can hurt another in three ways - through accident, error of judgement or intentionally. When a doctor has intentionally endangered the life of a patient, it becomes a case of murder. If he did not have the intention, but knew he was endangering the life of a patient, it becomes a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. However, it is impossible to demarcate where a judgement error becomes gross negligence.

It's difficult to hold a professional criminally liable for a judgement made in good faith. Say a lawyer does a bad job defending someone accused of murder and the client hangs. No matter how bad his defence, as long as he acted in good faith, can you hold him criminally liable? It's the same with doctors.

It can be finally concluded by adding that this judgment however led to an amendment in section 304-A of the IPC. The word used in the section is ‘negligence’, but not ‘gross negligence’.

 

REFERENCES

BOOKS

1.         Nelson, Indian Penal Code, 7th Edition (1983)

2.         Dr Sir Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, 10th Ed (1997)

3.         Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Law of Crimes, 22nd Edition (2002)

4.         Pillai P.S.A., Criminal Law, Butterworths, New Delhi (2002)

 

JOURNALS

1.         Criminal Law Journal, August 2004

2.         Health Management Express, September 2004

3.         Doctors’ Note, August 2004

 

ARTICLES

1.         Prof. Gopinath N. Shenoy, Criminal Liability in Medical practice, Health Management Express (Aug 15-30, 2004).

2.         A Relief to medical fraternity, Central Chronicle (August 6, 2004)

3.         Reactions to Criminal Liability Reactions to Supreme Court’s Judgment, Health Management Express (15-30 August 2004)

4.         Larger bench to reconsider on Supreme Court’s ruling on medical negligence, The Hindu (August 8, 2004)

5.         Abantika Ghosh, Whose life is it? Times News Network (August 10, 2004)

6.         Samiran Chakraverthi, When does negligence becomes truly criminal? Times of India (September 11, 2004)

 

WEB SITES

1.         www.lexsite.com/articles/lexdoc.asp?docid=99818

2.         www.healthlibrary.com/reading/ncure/law/part2.html

3.         www.healthmanagementexpress.com

4.         www.timesnewsnetwork.com



[1] Judgement of the Hon;ble Supreme Court in Dr.Suresh Gupta v. Govt. of N.C.T. of  Delhi and Anr.
[2] [Court of Appeal (1993) 4 Med LR 304]
[3] [(1993) 4 All ER 935; 15 BMLR 13; CA affirmed by (1994) 3 All ER 79 HL]
[4] Ibid
[5] (1981) l All ER 974; [1982] AC 510; [1981] 2 WLR 524 HL
[6] [AIR 1965 SC 831: 1965(1) Cr U 763: (1965) 2 SCJ 119: (1965) 1 SCWR 796. Criminal Appeal No. 171 of 1962, decided on 10.08.1964].
[7] [1960 Cr LJ 234; 1959 MP LJ 966]
[8] [1986(2) ACJ 696]
[9] [1977 ACJ 182.],
[10] [1994 (1) ACJ 375]
[11] [1989(1) ACJ 393]
[12]Ratanlal and Dhirajlal in Law of Crimes, 22nd Edition, on page 810 
[13] Ratanlal and Dhirajlal in Law of Crimes, 22nd Edition, Pp. 812
[14] Nelson,  Indian Penal Code, 7th Edition (1983) on page 1144
[15] ILR 3 All 776
[16] Nelson,  Indian Penal Code, 7th Edition (1983) on page 1145
[17] Dr Sir Hari Singh Gour, Penal Law of India, 10th Ed, p.2723